rfc8446

Browser-based answer to what the padlock means — four checks a real certificate passes and you can break one at a time, a flawless certificate for a lookalike domain that passes all four, and the first message your browser sends with the hostname in the clear. Reads captured certificates; it never connects to a site.

TLS 1.3 (RFC 8446) sans-IO state machine in pure Standard ML, verified against RFC 8448 vectors. Experimental, not for production security.

Análise prática comparando DNS tradicional (UDP/53) e DNS over HTTPS (DoH) no Firefox. Capturas realizadas com tcpdump e analisadas no Wireshark para visualizar diferenças de tráfego, privacidade e comportamento do TLS. Inclui consultas com nslookup, análise de SNI e documentação visual com 16 imagens.

Browser-based TLS 1.3 handshake walkthrough — step through X25519 key exchange, Ed25519 auth, the HKDF key schedule, and AES-GCM records, with a MITM attack that gets blocked. Real WebCrypto. No backend.

Browser-based TLS 1.3 handshake simulation using the X25519MLKEM768 hybrid post-quantum key exchange (codepoint 0x11EC) per draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem-04. Byte-level framing, full key schedule, side-by-side vs. classical X25519.

Browser-based ECH demo — draft-ietf-tls-esni. TLS 1.3 protects every byte except the hostname it announces first. Real HPKE seals the ClientHelloInner; a network observer sees only the outer. Tamper the ECHConfig and watch the real open fail. Metadata is the leak encryption doesn't close. No backends. No simulated math.

Browser-based downgrade demo — RFC 8446. Strip X25519MLKEM768 from the ClientHello and watch two PQ-capable endpoints agree on bare X25519. Success is the alarm. Negotiation happens before authentication — the fix isn't detection, it's binding the transcript into the key. FREAK and Logjam were this shape. No backends.