claybin

a drop-in replacement for bubblewrap, and the authority compiler underneath it.

# same flags, same resulting tree. the /lib symlinks are not decoration:
# a dynamically linked binary needs its loader, and without them BOTH
# commands fail with ENOENT -- which is the first thing you would have hit.
bwrap        --unshare-all --ro-bind /usr /usr \
             --symlink usr/lib /lib --symlink usr/lib /lib64 --symlink usr/bin /bin \
             --proc /proc --dev /dev --tmpfs /tmp --chdir / -- /bin/ls /
claybin-run  --unshare-all --ro-bind /usr /usr \
             --symlink usr/lib /lib --symlink usr/lib /lib64 --symlink usr/bin /bin \
             --proc /proc --dev /dev --tmpfs /tmp --chdir / -- /bin/ls /

(on debian and ubuntu the loader lives in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu, so bind /lib and /lib64 from the host instead of symlinking them.)

the difference is what happens underneath. bubblewrap gives you a mount namespace; claybin gives you a mount namespace and a landlock ruleset and a seccomp filter compiled from the same description, plus a report of exactly which walls the host could actually build.

see docs/bubblewrap.md for the porting guide.

it owns no event loop. supervising a sandboxed process is an event-loop job, and that job belongs to jaal — see docs/jaal.md.

Status: early — read this before using it for anything that matters.

claybin is days old. what follows is the honest state, not a pitch.

works and is tested. the mount model, landlock (including abi 6 scoping), seccomp with argument filtering, cgroup2 memory/pids/cpu limits, the policy algebra, and seccomp-notify brokering. 19 test binaries, an escape corpus of 47 named attacks that spawns real processes and tries to break out (46 blocked, 0 escaped, 1 not applicable on this kernel), a differential BPF interpreter, 1.28M fuzzed policies, and 57 conformance checks against real bubblewrap. CI runs gcc, clang+libc++, asan+ubsan, and a lane that fails if the sandboxing tests skip themselves.

not tested. aarch64 and riscv64 have never executed — the aarch64 syscall tables are cross-checked against the kernel's own headers, which is not the same thing. macOS and Windows compile a plan but cannot apply one. only two kernels have ever run this (6.8 and 7.2).

known open. bind_fd has a TOCTOU window between resolving the descriptor and mounting its path. it is not closable from inside claybin — both path-free bind routes are scoped to the mount namespace the fd came from, and the kernel rules are pinned in mount_test so a future relaxation is noticed. bubblewrap has the same window.

nobody has reviewed this but me. that is the single biggest reason not to trust it yet. one focused session on it found six real bugs, including a seccomp bypass (ioctl's request is 32 bits, so a filter comparing 64 was defeated by setting a high bit), three symlink escapes where a caller-supplied path could write outside the sandbox, and a capability probe that reported "user namespaces: yes" on hosts where the uid_map write fails. all fixed, each with a test that fails when the fix is reverted — but a defect-discovery rate like that is the signal, and there is no reason to think that session was the last one.

if you want a sandbox in production today, use bubblewrap. it is a decade old, audited, and runs under every flatpak on earth. use claybin if you want the stronger seccomp and landlock story, can tolerate finding bugs, and are willing to report them.

#include <claybin/policy/policy.hpp>

using namespace clay;
using namespace clay::literals;

auto policy = Policy<Draft>{}
    .ro_bind("/usr", "/usr")        // build a tree, bubblewrap-style
    .bind("/workspace", "/work")
    .deny("/work/.git")             // ...and punch a landlock hole in it
    .tmpfs("/tmp", 64_MB)
    .memory(512_MB)
    .syscall_profile(profiles::compiler())
    .seal();                        // consumes the draft; nothing can widen it

auto compiled = compile(policy, probe_host());
auto ok = compiled->require(Enforcement::strong, {CapId::fs_read, CapId::syscall_filter});

• two independent filesystem walls. every bind emits a landlock rule, so a path is checked by the mount namespace and by landlock. an escape has to beat both, and they fail in different directions.
• authority is a lattice. composition is meet. there is no way to widen a sealed policy, because the widening operator does not exist.
• proof-carrying. Witness<Cap> can only be minted by the backend that installed the mechanism. no backend is allowed to pretend.
• it refuses rather than degrades. bubblewrap has --not-a-security-boundary; claybin fails instead.
• fast by phase split. all thinking happens ahead of the fork and compiles into a POD plan. the post-fork path is raw syscalls, zero allocation, async-signal-safe.
• zero deps. no libseccomp, no libcap, no libmount. the BPF is a balanced interval tree, O(log n) per guest syscall instead of a linear chain.

see docs/design.md, and docs/platforms.md for what does and does not port off linux.

no dependencies beyond a c++23 compiler and cmake.

cmake -B build -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=RelWithDebInfo
cmake --build build -j
ctest --test-dir build --output-on-failure

MIT