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PEP: 480
Title: Surviving a Compromise of PyPI: End-to-end signing of packages
Version: $Revision$
Last-Modified: $Date$
Author: Trishank Karthik Kuppusamy <karthik@trishank.com>,
Vladimir Diaz <vladimir.diaz@nyu.edu>,
Justin Cappos <jcappos@nyu.edu>, Marina Moore <mm9693@nyu.edu>
BDFL-Delegate: Donald Stufft <donald@stufft.io>
Discussions-To: Packaging category on Python Discourse <https://discuss.python.org/c/packaging>
Status: Draft
Type: Standards Track
Content-Type: text/x-rst
Requires: 458
Created: 08-Oct-2014
Abstract
========
Proposed is an extension to PEP 458 that adds support for end-to-end signing
and the maximum security model. End-to-end signing allows both PyPI and
developers to sign for the distributions that are downloaded by clients. The
minimum security model proposed by PEP 458 supports continuous delivery of
distributions (because they are signed by online keys), but that model does not
protect distributions in the event that PyPI is compromised. In the minimum
security model, attackers who have compromised the signing keys stored on PyPI
Infrastructure may sign for malicious distributions. The maximum security model,
described in this PEP, retains the benefits of PEP 458 (e.g., immediate
availability of distributions that are uploaded to PyPI), but additionally
ensures that end-users are not at risk of installing forged software if PyPI is
compromised.
This PEP requires some changes to the PyPI infrastructure, and some suggested
changes for developers who wish to participate in end-to-end signing. These
changes include updating the metadata layout from PEP 458 to include delegations
to developer keys, adding a process to register developer keys with PyPI, and a
change in the upload workflow for developers who take advantage of end-to-end
signing. All of these changes are described in detail later in this PEP. Package
managers that wish to take advantage of end-to-end signing do not need to do any
additional work beyond what is required to consume metadata described in PEP
458.
This PEP discusses the changes made to PEP 458 but excludes its informational
elements to primarily focus on the maximum security model. For example, an
overview of The Update Framework or the basic mechanisms in PEP 458 are not
covered here. The changes to PEP 458 include modifications to the snapshot
process, key compromise analysis, auditing snapshots, and the steps that should
be taken in the event of a PyPI compromise. The signing and key management
process that PyPI MAY RECOMMEND is discussed but not strictly defined. How the
release process should be implemented to manage keys and metadata is left to
the implementors of the signing tools. That is, this PEP delineates the
expected cryptographic key type and signature format included in metadata that
MUST be uploaded by developers in order to support end-to-end verification of
distributions.
PEP Status
==========
The community discussed this PEP from 2014 to 2018. Due to the amount
of work required to implement this PEP, discussion was deferred until
after approval for the precursor step in PEP 458. As of mid-2020 PEP
458 is approved and implementation is in progress, and the PEP authors
aim to gain approval so they can secure appropriate funding for
implementation.
Rationale
=========
PEP 458 [1]_ proposes how PyPI should be integrated with The Update Framework
(TUF) [2]_. It explains how modern package managers like pip can be made more
secure, and the types of attacks that can be prevented if PyPI is modified on
the server side to include TUF metadata. Package managers can reference the
TUF metadata available on PyPI to download distributions more securely.
PEP 458 also describes the metadata layout of the PyPI repository and employs
the minimum security model, which supports continuous delivery of projects and
uses online cryptographic keys to sign the distributions uploaded by
developers. Although the minimum security model guards against most attacks on
software updaters [5]_ [7]_, such as mix-and-match and extraneous dependencies
attacks, it can be improved to support end-to-end signing and to prohibit
forged distributions in the event that PyPI is compromised.
PEP 480 builds on PEP 458 by adding support for developer signing, and
reducing the reliance on online keys to prevent malicious distributions.
The main strength of PEP 458 and the minimum security model is the automated
and simplified release process: developers may upload distributions and then
have PyPI sign for their distributions. Much of the release process is handled
in an automated fashion by online roles and this approach requires storing
cryptographic signing keys on the PyPI infrastructure. Unfortunately,
cryptographic keys that are stored online are vulnerable to theft. The maximum
security model, proposed in this PEP, permits developers to sign for the
distributions that they make available to PyPI users, and does not put
end-users at risk of downloading malicious distributions if the online keys
stored on PyPI infrastructure are compromised.
Threat Model
============
The threat model assumes the following:
* Offline keys are safe and securely stored.
* Attackers can compromise at least one of PyPI's trusted keys that are stored
online, and may do so at once or over a period of time.
* Attackers can respond to client requests.
* Attackers may control any number of developer keys for projects a client does
not want to install.
Attackers are considered successful if they can cause a client to install (or
leave installed) something other than the most up-to-date version of the
software the client is updating. When an attacker is preventing the
installation of updates, the attacker's goal is that clients not realize that
anything is wrong.
Definitions
===========
The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be
interpreted as described in RFC `2119`__.
__ http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt
This PEP focuses on integrating TUF with PyPI; however, the reader is
encouraged to read about TUF's design principles [2]_. It is also RECOMMENDED
that the reader be familiar with the TUF specification [3]_, and PEP 458 [1]_
(which this PEP is extending).
The following terms used in this PEP are defined in the Python Packaging
Glossary [4]_: *project*, *release*, *distribution*.
Terms used in this PEP are defined as follows:
* Distribution file: A versioned archive file that contains Python packages,
modules, and other resource files that are used to distribute a release. The
terms *distribution file*, *distribution package* [4]_, or simply
*distribution* or *package* may be used interchangeably in this PEP.
* Simple index: The HTML page that contains internal links to distribution
files.
* Target files: As a rule of thumb, target files are all files on PyPI whose
integrity should be guaranteed with TUF. Typically, this includes
distribution files, and PyPI metadata such as simple indices.
* Roles: Roles in TUF encompass the set of actions a party is authorized to
perform, including what metadata they may sign and which packages they are
responsible for. There is one *root* role in PyPI. There are multiple roles
whose responsibilities are delegated to them directly or indirectly by the
*root* role. The term "top-level role" refers to the *root* role and any role
delegated by the *root* role. Each role has a single metadata file that it is
trusted to provide.
* Metadata: Metadata are files that describe roles, other metadata, and target
files.
* Repository: A repository is a resource comprised of named metadata and target
files. Clients request metadata and target files stored on a repository.
* Consistent snapshot: A set of TUF metadata and target files that capture the
complete state of all projects on PyPI as they existed at some fixed point in
time.
* Developer: Either the owner or maintainer of a project who is allowed to
update TUF metadata, as well as distribution metadata and files for a given
project.
* Online key: A private cryptographic key that MUST be stored on the PyPI
server infrastructure. This usually allows automated signing with the key.
An attacker who compromises the PyPI infrastructure will be able to
immediately read these keys.
* Offline key: A private cryptographic key that MUST be stored independent of
the PyPI server infrastructure. This prevents automated signing with the
key. An attacker who compromises the PyPI infrastructure will not be able to
immediately read these keys.
* Threshold signature scheme: A role can increase its resilience to key
compromises by specifying that at least t out of n keys are REQUIRED to sign
its metadata. A compromise of t-1 keys is insufficient to compromise the
role itself. Saying that a role requires (t, n) keys denotes the threshold
signature property.
Maximum Security Model
======================
The maximum security model permits developers to sign their projects and to
upload signed metadata to PyPI. In the model proposed in this PEP, if the PyPI
infrastructure were compromised,
attackers would be unable to serve malicious versions of a *claimed* project
without having access to that project's developer key. Figure 1 depicts the
changes made to the metadata layout of the minimum security model, namely that
developer roles are now supported and that three new delegated roles exist:
*claimed*, *recently-claimed*, and *unclaimed*. The *bins* role from the
minimum security model has been renamed *unclaimed* and can contain any
projects that have not been added to *claimed*. The *unclaimed* role functions
just as before (i.e., as explained in PEP 458, projects added to this role are
signed by PyPI with an online key). Offline keys provided by developers ensure
the strength of the maximum security model over the minimum model. Although
the minimum security model supports continuous delivery of projects, all
projects are signed by an online key. That is, an attacker is able to corrupt
packages in the minimum security model, but not in the maximum model, without
also compromising a developer's key.
.. image:: pep-0480-1.png
Figure 1: An overview of the metadata layout in the maximum security model.
The maximum security model supports continuous delivery and survivable key
compromise.
Projects that are signed by developers and uploaded to PyPI for the first time
are added to the *recently-claimed* role. The *recently-claimed* role uses an
online key, so projects uploaded for the first time are immediately available
to clients. After some time has passed, PyPI administrators MAY periodically
move (e.g., every month) projects listed in *recently-claimed* to the *claimed*
role for maximum security. The *claimed* role uses an offline key, thus
projects added to this role cannot be easily forged if PyPI is compromised.
The *recently-claimed* role is separate from the *unclaimed* role for usability
and efficiency, not security. If new project delegations were prepended to
*unclaimed* metadata, *unclaimed* would need to be re-downloaded every time a
project obtained a key. By separating out new projects, the amount of data
retrieved is reduced. From a usability standpoint, it also makes it easier for
administrators to see which projects are now claimed. This information is
needed when moving keys from *recently-claimed* to *claimed*, which is
discussed in more detail in the "Producing Consistent Snapshots" section.
End-to-End Signing
==================
End-to-end signing allows both PyPI and developers to sign for the metadata
downloaded by clients. PyPI is trusted to make uploaded projects available to
clients (PyPI signs the metadata for this part of the process), and developers
sign the distributions that they upload to PyPI.
In order to delegate trust to a project, developers are required to submit a
public key to PyPI. PyPI takes the project's public key and adds it to parent
metadata that PyPI then signs. After the initial trust is established,
developers are required to sign distributions that they upload to PyPI using
the public key's corresponding private key. The signed TUF metadata that
developers upload to PyPI includes information like the distribution's file
size and hash, which package managers use to verify distributions that are
downloaded.
The practical implications of end-to-end signing is the extra administrative
work needed to delegate trust to a project, and the signed metadata that
developers MUST upload to PyPI along with the distribution. Specifically, PyPI
is expected to periodically sign metadata with an offline key by adding
projects to the *claimed* metadata file and signing it. In contrast, projects
are only ever signed with an online key in the minimum security model.
End-to-end signing does require manual intervention to delegate trust (i.e., to
sign metadata with an offline key), but this is a one-time cost and projects
have stronger protections against PyPI compromises thereafter.
Metadata Signatures, Key Management, and Signing Distributions
==============================================================
This section discusses the tools, signature scheme, and signing methods that
PyPI MAY recommend to implementors of the signing tools. Developers are
expected to use these tools to sign and upload distributions to PyPI. To
summarize the RECOMMENDED tools and schemes discussed in the subsections below,
developers MAY generate cryptographic keys and sign metadata (with the Ed25519
signature scheme) in some automated fashion, where the metadata includes the
information required to verify the authenticity of the distribution.
Developers then upload metadata to PyPI, where it will be available for
download by package managers such as pip (i.e., package managers that support
TUF metadata). The entire process is transparent to the end-users (using a
package manager that supports TUF) that download distributions from PyPI.
The first three subsections (Cryptographic Signature Scheme, Cryptographic Key
Files, and Key Management) cover the cryptographic components of the developer
release process. That is, which key type PyPI supports, how keys may be
stored, and how keys may be generated. The two subsections that follow the
first three discuss the PyPI modules that SHOULD be modified to support TUF
metadata. For example, Twine and Distutils are two projects that SHOULD be
modified. Finally, the last subsection goes over the automated key management
and signing solution that is RECOMMENDED for the signing tools.
TUF's design is flexible with respect to cryptographic key types, signatures,
and signing methods. The tools, modification, and methods discussed in the
following sections are RECOMMENDATIONS for the implementors of the signing
tools.
Cryptographic Signature Scheme: Ed25519
---------------------------------------
The package manager (pip) shipped with CPython MUST work on non-CPython
interpreters and cannot have dependencies that have to be compiled (i.e., the
PyPI+TUF integration MUST NOT require compilation of C extensions in order to
verify cryptographic signatures). Verification of signatures MUST be done in
Python, and verifying RSA [11]_ signatures in pure-Python may be impractical due
to speed. Therefore, PyPI MAY use the `Ed25519`__ signature scheme.
__ http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/
Ed25519 [12]_ is a public-key signature system that uses small cryptographic
signatures and keys. A `pure-Python implementation`__ of the Ed25519 signature
scheme is available. Verification of Ed25519 signatures is fast even when
performed in Python.
__ https://github.com/pyca/ed25519
Cryptographic Key Files
-----------------------
The implementation MAY encrypt key files with AES-256-CTR-Mode and strengthen
passwords with PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 (100K iterations by default, but this may be
overridden by the developer). The current Python implementation of TUF can use
any cryptographic library (support for PyCA cryptography will be added in the
future), may override the default number of PBKDF2 iterations, and the KDF
tweaked to taste.
Key Management: miniLock
------------------------
An easy-to-use key management solution is needed. One solution is to derive a
private key from a password so that developers do not have to manage
cryptographic key files across multiple computers. `miniLock`__ is an example
of how this can be done. Developers may view the cryptographic key as a
secondary password. miniLock also works well with a signature scheme like
Ed25519, which only needs a very small key.
__ https://github.com/kaepora/miniLock#-minilock
Third-party Upload Tools: Twine
-------------------------------
Third-party tools like `Twine`__ MAY be modified (if they wish to support
distributions that include TUF metadata) to sign and upload developer projects
to PyPI. Twine is a utility for interacting with PyPI that uses TLS to upload
distributions, and prevents MITM attacks on usernames and passwords.
__ https://github.com/pypa/twine
Build backends
--------------
Build backends MAY be modified to sign metadata and to upload signed
distributions to PyPI.
Automated Signing Solution
--------------------------
An easy-to-use key management solution is RECOMMENDED for developers. One
approach is to generate a cryptographic private key from a user password, akin
to miniLock. Although developer signatures can remain optional, this approach
may be inadequate due to the great number of potentially unsigned dependencies
each distribution may have. If any one of these dependencies is unsigned, it
negates any benefit the project gains from signing its own distribution (i.e.,
attackers would only need to compromise one of the unsigned dependencies to
attack end-users). Requiring developers to manually sign distributions and
manage keys is expected to render key signing an unused feature.
A default, PyPI-mediated key management and package signing solution that is
`transparent`__ to developers and does not require a key escrow (sharing of
encrypted private keys with PyPI) is RECOMMENDED for the signing tools.
Additionally, the signing tools SHOULD circumvent the sharing of private keys
across multiple machines of each developer.
__ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transparency_%28human%E2%80%93computer_interaction%29
The following outlines an automated signing solution that a new developer MAY
follow to upload a distribution to PyPI:
1. Register a PyPI project.
2. Enter a secondary password (independent of the PyPI user account password).
3. Optional: Add a new identity to the developer's PyPI user account from a
second machine (after a password prompt).
4. Upload project.
Step 1 is the normal procedure followed by developers to `register a PyPI
project`__.
__ https://pypi.python.org/pypi?:action=register_form
Step 2 generates an encrypted key file (private), uploads an Ed25519 public key
to PyPI, and signs the TUF metadata that is generated for the distribution.
Optionally adding a new identity from a second machine, by simply entering a
password, in step 3 also generates an encrypted private key file and uploads an
Ed25519 public key to PyPI. Separate identities MAY be created to allow a
developer, or other project maintainers, to sign releases on multiple machines.
An existing verified identity (its public key is contained in project metadata
or has been uploaded to PyPI) signs for new identities. By default, project
metadata has a signature threshold of "1" and other verified identities may
create new releases to satisfy the threshold.
Step 4 uploads the distribution file and TUF metadata to PyPI. The "Snapshot
Process" section discusses in detail the procedure followed by developers to
upload a distribution to PyPI.
Generation of cryptographic files and signatures is transparent to the
developers in the default case: developers need not be aware that packages are
automatically signed. However, the signing tools should be flexible; a single
project key may also be shared between multiple machines if manual key
management is preferred (e.g., ssh-copy-id).
The `repository`__ and `developer`__ TUF tools currently support all of the
recommendations previously mentioned, except for the automated signing
solution, which SHOULD be added to Distlib, Twine, and other third-party
signing tools. The automated signing solution calls available repository tool
functions to sign metadata and to generate the cryptographic key files.
__ https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/blob/develop/tuf/README.md
__ https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/blob/develop/tuf/README-developer-tools.md
Snapshot Process
----------------
The snapshot process is fairly simple and SHOULD be automated. The snapshot
process MUST keep in memory the latest working set of *root*, *targets*, and
delegated roles. Every minute or so the snapshot process will sign for this
latest working set. (Recall that project uploads continuously
inform the snapshot process about the latest delegated metadata in a
concurrency-safe manner. The snapshot process will actually sign for a copy of
the latest working set while the latest working set in memory will be updated
with information that is continuously communicated by the project transaction
processes.) The snapshot process MUST generate and sign new *timestamp*
metadata that will vouch for the metadata (*root*, *targets*, and delegated
roles) generated in the previous step. Finally, the snapshot process MUST make
available to clients the new *timestamp* and *snapshot* metadata representing
the latest snapshot.
A *claimed* or *recently-claimed* project will need to upload in its
transaction to PyPI not just targets (a simple index as well as distributions)
but also TUF metadata. The project MAY do so by uploading a ZIP file containing
two directories, /metadata/ (containing delegated targets metadata files) and
/targets/ (containing targets such as the project simple index and
distributions that are signed by the delegated targets metadata).
Whenever the project uploads metadata or target files to PyPI, PyPI SHOULD check the
project TUF metadata for at least the following properties:
* A threshold number of the developers keys registered with PyPI by that
project MUST have signed for the delegated targets metadata file that
represents the "root" of targets for that project (e.g. metadata/targets/
project.txt).
* The signatures of delegated targets metadata files MUST be valid.
* The delegated targets metadata files MUST NOT have expired.
* The delegated targets metadata MUST be consistent with the targets.
* A delegator MUST NOT delegate targets that were not delegated to itself by
another delegator.
* A delegatee MUST NOT sign for targets that were not delegated to itself by a
delegator.
If PyPI chooses to check the project TUF metadata, then PyPI MAY choose to
reject publishing any set of metadata or target files that do not meet these
requirements.
PyPI MUST enforce access control by ensuring that each project can only write
to the TUF metadata for which it is responsible. It MUST do so by ensuring that
project upload processes write to the correct metadata as well as correct
locations within those metadata. For example, a project upload process for
an unclaimed project MUST write to the correct target paths in the correct
delegated unclaimed metadata for the targets of the project.
On rare occasions, PyPI MAY wish to extend the TUF metadata format for projects
in a backward-incompatible manner. Note that PyPI will NOT be able to
automatically rewrite existing TUF metadata on behalf of projects in order to
upgrade the metadata to the new backward-incompatible format because this would
invalidate the signatures of the metadata as signed by developer keys.
Instead, package managers SHOULD be written to recognize and handle multiple
incompatible versions of TUF metadata so that claimed and recently-claimed
projects could be offered a reasonable time to migrate their metadata to newer
but backward-incompatible formats. One mechanism for handling this version
change is described in TAP 14__.
__ https://github.com/theupdateframework/taps/blob/master/tap14.md
If PyPI eventually runs out of disk space to produce a new consistent snapshot,
then PyPI MAY then use something like a "mark-and-sweep" algorithm to delete
sufficiently outdated consistent snapshots. That is, only outdated metadata
like *timestamp* and *snapshot* that are no longer used are deleted.
Specifically, in order to preserve the latest consistent snapshot, PyPI would
walk objects -- beginning from the root (*timestamp*) -- of the latest
consistent snapshot, mark all visited objects, and delete all unmarked objects.
The last few consistent snapshots may be preserved in a similar fashion.
Deleting a consistent snapshot will cause clients to see nothing except HTTP
404 responses to any request for a target of the deleted consistent snapshot.
Clients SHOULD then retry (as before) their requests with the latest consistent
snapshot.
All package managers that support TUF metadata MUST be modified to download
every metadata and target file (except for *timestamp* metadata) by including,
in the request for the file, the cryptographic hash of the file in the
filename. Following the filename convention RECOMMENDED in the next
subsection, a request for the file at filename.ext will be transformed to the
equivalent request for the file at digest.filename.
Finally, PyPI SHOULD use a `transaction log`__ to record project transaction
processes and queues so that it will be easier to recover from errors after a
server failure.
__ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transaction_log
Producing Consistent Snapshots
------------------------------
PyPI is responsible for updating, depending on the project, either the
*claimed*, *recently-claimed*, or *unclaimed* metadata and associated delegated
metadata. Every project MUST upload its set of metadata and targets in a single
transaction. The uploaded set of files is called the "project transaction."
How PyPI MAY validate files in a project transaction is discussed in a later
section. The focus of this section is on how PyPI will respond to a project
transaction.
Every metadata and target file MUST include in its filename the `hex digest`__
of its `BLAKE2b-256`__ hash, which PyPI may prepend to filenames after the files
have been uploaded. For this PEP, it is RECOMMENDED that PyPI adopt a simple
convention of the form: *digest.filename*, where filename is the original
filename without a copy of the hash, and digest is the hex digest of the hash.
__ http://docs.python.org/2/library/hashlib.html#hashlib.hash.hexdigest
__ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BLAKE_(hash_function)#BLAKE2
When an unclaimed project uploads a new transaction, a project transaction
process MUST add all new target files and relevant delegated unclaimed metadata.
The project upload process MUST inform the snapshot process about new
delegated unclaimed metadata.
When a *recently-claimed* project uploads a new transaction, a project
upload process MUST add all new target files and delegated targets metadata for
the project. If the project is new, then the project upload process MUST
also add new *recently-claimed* metadata with the public keys (which MUST be
part of the transaction) for the project. *recently-claimed* projects have a
threshold value of "1" set by the upload process. Finally, the project
upload process MUST inform the snapshot process about new
*recently-claimed* metadata, as well as the current set of delegated targets
metadata for the project.
The upload process for a claimed project is slightly different in that
PyPI administrators periodically move (a manual process that MAY occur every
two weeks to a month) projects from the *recently-claimed* role to the
*claimed* role. (Moving a project from *recently-claimed* to *claimed* is a
manual process because PyPI administrators have to use an offline key to sign
the claimed project's distribution.) A project upload process MUST then
add new *recently-claimed* and *claimed* metadata to reflect this migration. As
is the case for a *recently-claimed* project, the project upload process
MUST always add all new target files and delegated targets metadata for the claimed
project. Finally, the project upload process MUST inform the consistent
snapshot process about new *recently-claimed* or *claimed* metadata, as well as
the current set of delegated targets metadata for the project.
Project upload processes SHOULD be automated, except when PyPI
administrators move a project from the *recently-claimed* role to the *claimed*
role. Project upload processes MUST also be applied atomically: either all
metadata and target files -- or none of them -- are added. The project transaction
processes and snapshot process SHOULD work concurrently. Finally, project
upload processes SHOULD keep in memory the latest *claimed*,
*recently-claimed*, and *unclaimed* metadata so that they will be correctly
updated in new consistent snapshots.
The queue MAY be processed concurrently in order of appearance, provided that
the following rules are observed:
1. No pair of project upload processes may concurrently work on the same
project.
2. No pair of project upload processes may concurrently work on
*unclaimed* projects that belong to the same delegated *unclaimed* role.
3. No pair of project upload processes may concurrently work on new
recently-claimed projects.
4. No pair of project upload processes may concurrently work on new
claimed projects.
5. No project upload process may work on a new claimed project while
another project upload process is working on a new recently-claimed
project and vice versa.
These rules MUST be observed to ensure that metadata is not read from or
written to inconsistently.
Auditing Snapshots
------------------
If a malicious party compromises PyPI, they can sign arbitrary files with any
of the online keys. The roles with offline keys (i.e., *root* and *targets*)
are still protected. To safely recover from a repository compromise, snapshots
should be audited to ensure that files are only restored to trusted versions.
When a repository compromise has been detected, the integrity of three types of
information must be validated:
1. If the online keys of the repository have been compromised, they can be
revoked by having the *targets* role sign new metadata, delegated to a new
key.
2. If the role metadata on the repository has been changed, this will impact
the metadata that is signed by online keys. Any role information created
since the compromise should be discarded. As a result, developers of new
projects will need to re-register their projects.
3. If the packages themselves may have been tampered with, they can be
validated using the stored hash information for packages that existed in
trusted metadata before the compromise. Also, new distributions that are
signed by developers in the *claimed* role may be safely retained. However,
any distributions signed by developers in the *recently-claimed* or
*unclaimed* roles should be discarded.
In order to safely restore snapshots in the event of a compromise, PyPI SHOULD
maintain a small number of its own mirrors to copy PyPI snapshots according to
some schedule. The mirroring protocol can be used immediately for this
purpose. The mirrors must be secured and isolated such that they are
responsible only for mirroring PyPI. The mirrors can be checked against one
another to detect accidental or malicious failures.
Another approach is to periodically generate the cryptographic hash of
each *snapshot* and tweet it. For example, upon receiving the tweet, a
user comes forward with the actual metadata and the repository
maintainers are then able to verify the metadata's cryptographic hash.
Alternatively, PyPI may periodically archive its own versions of
*snapshots* rather than rely on externally provided metadata. In this
case, PyPI SHOULD take the cryptographic hash of every package on the
repository and store this data on an offline device. If any package
hash has changed, this indicates an attack has occurred.
Attacks that serve different versions of metadata or that freeze a version of a
package at a specific version can be handled by TUF with techniques such as
implicit key revocation and metadata mismatch detection [2]_.
Key Compromise Analysis
=======================
This PEP has covered the maximum security model, the TUF roles that should be
added to support continuous delivery of distributions, how to generate and sign
the metadata of each role, and how to support distributions that have been
signed by developers. The remaining sections discuss how PyPI SHOULD audit
repository metadata, and the methods PyPI can use to detect and recover from a
PyPI compromise.
Table 1 summarizes a few of the attacks possible when a threshold number of
private cryptographic keys (belonging to any of the PyPI roles) are
compromised. The leftmost column lists the roles (or a combination of roles)
that have been compromised, and the columns to the right show whether the
compromised roles leaves clients susceptible to malicious updates, freeze
attacks, or metadata inconsistency attacks.
+-------------------+-------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| Role Compromise | Malicious Updates | Freeze Attack | Metadata Inconsistency|
| | | | Attacks |
+===================+===================+=======================+=======================+
| timestamp | NO | YES | NO |
| | snapshot and | limited by earliest | snapshot needs to |
| | targets or any | root, targets, or bin | cooperate |
| | of the delegated | metadata expiry time | |
| | roles need to | | |
| | cooperate | | |
+-------------------+-------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| snapshot | NO | NO | NO |
| | timestamp and | timestamp needs to | timestamp needs to |
| | targets or any of | cooperate | cooperate |
| | the delegated | | |
| | roles need to | | |
| | cooperate | | |
+-------------------+-------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| timestamp | NO | YES | YES |
| *AND* | targets or any | limited by earliest | limited by earliest |
| snapshot | of the delegated | root, targets, or bin | root, targets, or bin |
| | roles need to | metadata expiry time | metadata expiry time |
| | cooperate | | |
| | | | |
+-------------------+-------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| targets | NO | NOT APPLICABLE | NOT APPLICABLE |
| *OR* | timestamp and | need timestamp and | need timestamp |
| **claimed** | snapshot need to | snapshot | and snapshot |
| *OR* | cooperate | | |
| recently-claimed | | | |
| *OR* | | | |
| unclaimed | | | |
| *OR* | | | |
| **project** | | | |
+-------------------+-------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| (timestamp | YES | YES | YES |
| *AND* | | limited by earliest | limited by earliest |
| snapshot) | | root, targets, or bin | root, targets, or bin |
| *AND* | | metadata expiry time | metadata expiry time |
| **project** | | | |
| | | | |
+-------------------+-------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| (timestamp | YES | YES | YES |
| *AND* | but only of | limited by earliest | limited by earliest |
| snapshot) | projects not | root, targets, | root, targets, |
| *AND* | delegated by | claimed, | claimed, |
| (recently-claimed | claimed | recently-claimed, | recently-claimed, |
| *OR* | | project, or unclaimed | project, or unclaimed |
| unclaimed) | | metadata expiry time | metadata expiry time |
+-------------------+-------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| (timestamp | | YES | YES |
| *AND* | | limited by earliest | limited by earliest |
| snapshot) | | root, targets, | root, targets, |
| *AND* | YES | claimed, | claimed, |
| (targets *OR* | | recently-claimed, | recently-claimed, |
| **claimed**) | | project, or unclaimed | project, or unclaimed |
| | | metadata expiry time | metadata expiry time |
+-------------------+-------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| root | YES | YES | YES |
+-------------------+-------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
Table 1: Attacks that are possible by compromising certain combinations of role
keys. In `September 2013`__, it was shown how the latest version (at the time)
of pip was susceptible to these attacks and how TUF could protect users against
them [8]_. Roles signed by offline keys are in **bold**.
__ https://mail.python.org/pipermail/distutils-sig/2013-September/022755.html
Note that compromising *targets* or any delegated role (except for project
targets metadata) does not immediately allow an attacker to serve malicious
updates. The attacker must also compromise the *timestamp* and *snapshot*
roles (which are both online and therefore more likely to be compromised).
This means that in order to launch any attack, one must not only be able to act
as a man-in-the-middle, but also compromise the *timestamp* key (or compromise
the *root* keys and sign a new *timestamp* key). To launch any attack other
than a freeze attack, one must also compromise the *snapshot* key. Finally, a
compromise of the PyPI infrastructure MAY introduce malicious updates to
*recently-claimed* projects because the keys for these roles are online.
In the Event of a Key Compromise
--------------------------------
A key compromise means that a threshold of keys belonging to developers or the
roles on PyPI, as well as the PyPI infrastructure, have been compromised and
used to sign new metadata on PyPI.
If a threshold number of developer keys of a project have been compromised,
the project MUST take the following steps:
1. The project metadata and targets MUST be restored to the last known good
consistent snapshot where the project was not known to be compromised. This
can be done by developers repackaging and resigning all targets with
the new keys.
2. The project's metadata MUST have its version numbers incremented, expiry
times suitably extended, and signatures renewed.
Whereas PyPI MUST take the following steps:
1. Revoke the compromised developer keys from the *recently-claimed* or
*claimed* role. This is done by replacing the compromised developer keys
with newly issued developer keys.
2. A new timestamped consistent snapshot MUST be issued.
If a threshold number of *timestamp*, *snapshot*, *recently-claimed*, or
*unclaimed* keys have been compromised, then PyPI MUST take the following
steps:
1. Revoke the *timestamp*, *snapshot*, and *targets* role keys from the
root role. This is done by replacing the compromised *timestamp*,
*snapshot*, and *targets* keys with newly issued keys.
2. Revoke the *recently-claimed* and *unclaimed* keys from the *targets* role
by replacing their keys with newly issued keys. Sign the new targets role
metadata and discard the new keys (because, as we explained earlier, this
increases the security of targets metadata).
3. Clear all targets or delegations in the *recently-claimed* role and delete
all associated delegated targets metadata. Recently registered projects
SHOULD register their developer keys again with PyPI.
4. All targets of the *recently-claimed* and *unclaimed* roles SHOULD be
compared with the last known good consistent snapshot where none of the
timestamp, snapshot, recently-claimed, or unclaimed keys were known to have
been compromised. Added, updated, or deleted targets in the compromised
consistent snapshot that do not match the last known good consistent
snapshot SHOULD be restored to their previous versions. After ensuring the
integrity of all unclaimed targets, the unclaimed metadata MUST be
regenerated.
5. The *recently-claimed* and *unclaimed* metadata MUST have their version
numbers incremented, expiry times suitably extended, and signatures
renewed.
6. A new timestamped consistent snapshot MUST be issued.
This would preemptively protect all of these roles even though only one of them
may have been compromised.
If a threshold number of the *targets* or *claimed* keys have been compromised,
then there is little that an attacker would be able do without the *timestamp*
and *snapshot* keys. In this case, PyPI MUST simply revoke the compromised
*targets* or *claimed* keys by replacing them with new keys in the *root* and
*targets* roles, respectively.
If a threshold number of the *timestamp*, *snapshot*, and *claimed* keys have
been compromised, then PyPI MUST take the following steps in addition to the
steps taken when either the *timestamp* or *snapshot* keys are compromised:
1. Revoke the *claimed* role keys from the targets role and replace them with
newly issued keys.
2. All project targets of the claimed roles SHOULD be compared with the last
known good consistent snapshot where none of the *timestamp*, *snapshot*,
or *claimed* keys were known to have been compromised. Added, updated, or
deleted targets in the compromised consistent snapshot that do not match
the last known good consistent snapshot MAY be restored to their previous
versions. After ensuring the integrity of all claimed project targets, the
*claimed* metadata MUST be regenerated.
3. The claimed metadata MUST have their version numbers incremented, expiry
times suitably extended, and signatures renewed.
Following these steps would preemptively protect all of these roles even though
only one of them may have been compromised.
If a threshold number of *root* keys have been compromised, then PyPI MUST take
the steps taken when the *targets* role has been compromised. All of the
*root* keys must also be replaced.
It is also RECOMMENDED that PyPI sufficiently document compromises with
security bulletins. These security bulletins will be most informative when
users of pip-with-TUF are unable to install or update a project because the
keys for the *timestamp*, *snapshot*, or *root* roles are no longer valid.
Users could then visit the PyPI web site to consult security bulletins that
would help to explain why users are no longer able to install or update, and
then take action accordingly. When a threshold number of *root* keys have not
been revoked due to a compromise, then new *root* metadata may be safely
updated because a threshold number of existing *root* keys will be used to sign
for the integrity of the new *root* metadata. TUF clients will be able to
verify the integrity of the new *root* metadata with a threshold number of
previously known *root* keys. This will be the common case. In the worst
case, where a threshold number of *root* keys have been revoked due to a
compromise, an end-user may choose to update new *root* metadata with
`out-of-band`__ mechanisms.
__ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Out-of-band#Authentication
Appendix A: PyPI Build Farm and End-to-End Signing
==================================================
PyPI administrators intend to support a central build farm. The PyPI build
farm will auto-generate a `Wheel`__, for each distribution that is uploaded by
developers, on PyPI infrastructure and on supported platforms. Package
managers will likely install projects by downloading these PyPI Wheels (which
can be installed much faster than source distributions) rather than the source
distributions signed by developers. The implications of having a central build
farm with end-to-end signing SHOULD be investigated before the maximum security
model is implemented.
__ http://wheel.readthedocs.org/en/latest/
An issue with a central build farm and end-to-end signing is that developers
are unlikely to sign Wheel distributions once they have been generated on PyPI
infrastructure. However, generating wheels from source distributions that are
signed by developers can still be beneficial, provided that building Wheels is
a deterministic process. If deterministic builds are infeasible, developers
may delegate trust of these wheels to a PyPI role that signs for wheels with
an online key.
References
==========
.. [1] https://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0458/
.. [2] https://theupdateframework.io/papers/survivable-key-compromise-ccs2010.pdf
.. [3] https://github.com/theupdateframework/tuf/blob/develop/docs/tuf-spec.txt
.. [4] https://packaging.python.org/glossary
.. [5] https://github.com/theupdateframework/pip/wiki/Attacks-on-software-repositories
.. [6] https://mail.python.org/pipermail/distutils-sig/2013-September/022773.html
.. [7] https://theupdateframework.io/papers/attacks-on-package-managers-ccs2008.pdf
.. [8] https://mail.python.org/pipermail/distutils-sig/2013-September/022755.html
.. [9] https://pypi.python.org/security
.. [10] https://mail.python.org/pipermail/distutils-sig/2013-August/022154.html
.. [11] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RSA_%28algorithm%29
.. [12] http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/
Acknowledgements
================
This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation
under Grants No. CNS-1345049 and CNS-0959138. Any opinions, findings, and
conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the
author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science
Foundation.
We thank Nick Coghlan, Daniel Holth, Donald Stufft, Sumana
Harihareswara, and the distutils-sig community in general for helping
us to think about how to usably and efficiently integrate TUF with
PyPI.
Roger Dingledine, Sebastian Hahn, Nick Mathewson, Martin Peck and Justin
Samuel helped us to design TUF from its predecessor Thandy of the Tor project.
We appreciate the efforts of Konstantin Andrianov, Geremy Condra, Zane Fisher,
Justin Samuel, Tian Tian, Santiago Torres, John Ward, and Yuyu Zheng to develop
TUF.
Copyright
=========
This document has been placed in the public domain.