Firms transacting using blockchain-based assets and liabilities have begun to enter capital markets in search for funding. Historically, firms have been able to raise substantial funding without an audited financial statement, however we project that in the future, audits will become a common requirement given increased competition among firms, increased scrutiny from regulators, past instances of fraud, and firms seeking an IPO. At the time of writing, accounting firms are hesitant to accept mandates from companies that hold a significant amount of cryptoassets primarily because the blockchain market introduces novel, technically sophisticated, and risky propositions that auditors are unequipped to handle. Through interviews with senior accounting professionals and structured brainstorming meetings with a multidisciplinary team of accountants and blockchain experts, we critically analyze the purported roadblocks to auditing blockchain firms and map them to traditional auditing practices, demonstrating that providing an audit opinion is challenging but not insurmountable.

Blockchain is widely regarded as a breakthrough innovation that may have a profound impact on the economy and society, of a magnitude comparable to the effects of the introduction of the Internet itself. In essence, a blockchain is a decentralized peer-to-peer network with no central authority figure, which adds information to the distributed database by collectively validating the accuracy of data. Since each node of the network participates in the review and confirmation of the new information before being accepted, the need for a trustworthy intermediary is eliminated. However, as trust plays an essential role in affecting decisions when transacting with one another, it is important to understand which implications the decentralized nature of blockchain may have on individuals' sense of trust. In this contribution, we argue that the adoption of blockchain is not only a technological, but foremostly a psychological challenge, which crucially depends on the possibility of creating a trust management approach that matches the underlying distributed communication system. We first describe the decentralization technologies and possibilities they hold for the near future. Next, we discuss the psycho-social implications of the introduction of decentralized processes of trust, examining some potential scenarios, and outline a research agenda.

Custom tokens are an integral component of decentralized applications (dapps) deployed on Ethereum and other blockchain platforms. For Ethereum, the ERC20 standard is a widely used token interface and is interoperable with many existing dapps, user interface platforms, and popular web applications (e.g., exchange services). An ERC20 security issue, known as the "multiple withdrawal attack", was raised on GitHub and has been open since November 2016. The issue concerns ERC20's defined method approve() which was envisioned as a way for token holders to give permission for other users and dapps to withdraw a capped number of tokens. The security issue arises when a token holder wants to adjust the amount of approved tokens from N to M (this could be an increase or decrease). If malicious, a user or dapp who is approved for N tokens can front-run the adjustment transaction to first withdraw N tokens, then allow the approval to be confirmed, and withdraw an additional M tokens. In this paper, we evaluate 10 proposed mitigations for this issues and find that no solution is fully satisfactory. We then propose 2 new solutions that mitigate the attack, one of which fully fulfills constraints of the standard, and the second one shows a general limitation in addressing this issue from ERC20's approve method.

We consider front-running to be a course of action where an entity benefits from prior access to privileged market information about upcoming transactions and trades. Front-running has been an issue in financial instrument markets since the 1970s. With the advent of the blockchain technology, front-running has resurfaced in new forms we explore here, instigated by blockchains decentralized and transparent nature. In this paper, we draw from a scattered body of knowledge and instances of front-running across the top 25 most active decentral applications (DApps) deployed on Ethereum blockchain. Additionally, we carry out a detailed analysis of Status.im initial coin offering (ICO) and show evidence of abnormal miners behavior indicative of front-running token purchases. Finally, we map the proposed solutions to front-running into useful categories.

In this paper, we examine the recent trend towards in-browser mining of cryptocurrencies; in particular, the mining of Monero through Coinhive and similar code- bases. In this model, a user visiting a website will download a JavaScript code that executes client-side in her browser, mines a cryptocurrency, typically without her consent or knowledge, and pays out the seigniorage to the website. Websites may consciously employ this as an alternative or to supplement advertisement revenue, may offer premium content in exchange for mining, or may be unwittingly serving the code as a result of a breach (in which case the seigniorage is collected by the attacker). The cryptocurrency Monero is preferred seemingly for its unfriendliness to large-scale ASIC mining that would drive browser-based efforts out of the market, as well as for its purported privacy features. In this paper, we survey this landscape, conduct some measurements to establish its prevalence and profitability, outline an ethical framework for considering whether it should be classified as an attack or business opportunity, and make suggestions for the detection, mitigation and/or prevention of browser-based mining for non- consenting users.

In this paper, we present Velocity, a decentralized market deployed on Ethereum for trading a custom type of derivative option. To enable the smart contract to work, we also implement a price fetching tool called PriceGeth. We present this as a case study, noting challenges in development of the system that might be of independent interest to whose working on smart contract implementations. We also apply recent academic results on the security of the Solidity smart contract language in validating our code’s security. Finally, we discuss more generally the use of smart contracts in modelling financial derivatives.

In this paper we discuss existing approaches for Bitcoin payments, as suitable for a small business for small-value transactions. We develop an evaluation framework utilizing security, usability, deployability criteria,, examine several existing systems, tools. Following a requirements engineering approach, we designed, implemented a new Point of Sale (PoS) system that satisfies an optimal set of criteria within our evaluation framework. Our open source system, Aunja PoS, has been deployed in a real world cafe since October 2014.

We live in an era where Internet is one of the daily needs of human life. People use Internet banking instead of going to banks, they use email rather than postal mail.This leads to a robust digital way of living, but this also means people are trusting middle companies and third parties for their online services. The need of having a digital form of money that is not being controlled by one entity is plain to see. Bitcoin is the first and the most popular decentralized virtual currency. It is based on cryptographic functions to remove the need of a central bank and regulates the generation of new units. In this thesis, we would like to look at available tools to facilitate users in holding and using Bitcoin by a perspective on usability and security, and then evaluate the possibilities for a small business to accept Bitcoin payments. Our focus is on the usability of these tools and developing a useful framework for comparing and evaluating future tools. While many security tools have been studied from a usability perspective, our work is the first to look at Bitcoin.

Bitcoin users are directly or indirectly forced to deal with public key cryptography, which has a number of security and usability challenges that differ from the password-based authentication underlying most online banking services. Users must ensure that keys are simultaneously accessible, resistant to digital theft and resilient to loss. In this paper, we contribute an evaluation framework for comparing Bitcoin key management approaches, and conduct a broad usability evaluation of six representative Bitcoin clients. We find that Bitcoin shares many of the fundamental challenges of key management known from other domains, but that Bitcoin may present a unique opportunity to rethink key management for end users.

Host-based intrusion detection systems monitor systems in operation for significant deviations from normal (and healthy) behaviour. Many approaches have been proposed in the literature. Most of them, however, do not consider even the basic attack prevention mechanisms that are activated by default on today's many operating systems. Examples of such mechanisms include Address Space Layout Randomization and Data Execution Prevention. With such security methods in place, attackers are forced to perform additional actions to circumvent them. In this research, we conjecture that some of these actions may require the use of additional system calls. If so, one can trace such attacks to discover attack patterns that can later be used to enhance the detection power of anomaly detection systems. The purpose of this short paper is to motivate the need to investigate the impact of attack on system calls while trying to overcome these prevention mechanisms.